November 18, 2026
← All advisories

CODESYS Engineering Tools Can Be Fooled by a Fake Automation Server

Red Tiger Security infographic: CODESYS Engineering Tools Can Be Fooled by a Fake Server. Three flaws in the CODESYS Automation Server Connector and Service Tool, fixed in version 1.40.0.0, per CODESYS advisories of 17 November 2026. A flow diagram links three boxes. The engineering laptop is hit by CVE-2026-118496 (7.5, an unchecked web address from the server could run code) and CVE-2026-118498 (7.5, file names can write outside their folder). The Automation Server in the middle may be fake or intercepted; no password is needed and no attacks are reported. The Edge Gateway to the controllers is hit by CVE-2026-118497 (6.8, a fake certificate accepted at enrollment lets traffic be read and changed). Four steps: update to 1.40.0.0, trust only your own server, keep the network path trusted, and limit scripting and watch laptops for new files.

CODESYS GmbH published two security advisories on 17 November 2026 covering three vulnerabilities in the CODESYS Automation Server Connector and the CODESYS Service Tool, and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security repeated the warning the same day in its advisory AV26-1169. CODESYS is the programming software that many controller and drive makers build into their products, so it sits on a lot of engineering laptops in plants. The Automation Server Connector is an add-on for the CODESYS Development System that syncs projects with the CODESYS Automation Server, the company's central project and device management platform, and configures CODESYS Edge Gateways, the small services that link that server to the controllers on the plant network. The Service Tool is a separate program for setting up those Edge Gateways. CODESYS has fixed all three flaws in version 1.40.0.0 of both products. None of the sources report attacks in the wild.

What is affected

  1. CVE-2026-118496, scored 7.5 out of 10 on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) version 3.1. Both products process a web address sent by the Automation Server without checking it properly. If someone controls a fake Automation Server and convinces a user to trust it, or sits in the middle of the connection, they could run their own code with the rights of the person using the tool. This affects the Connector and the Service Tool from version 1.0.0.0 up to, but not including, 1.40.0.0 (CODESYS advisory 2026-13, also listed as VDE-2026-145).
  2. CVE-2026-118497, scored 6.8. Both products do not check the Automation Server's security certificate well enough when a user starts certificate enrollment. A certificate is the digital ID that proves a server is who it says it is. An attacker in the middle of the connection could present a fake certificate that gets accepted, then read and change traffic between the Automation Server and the controller network. Same products and versions as above.
  3. CVE-2026-118498, scored 7.5. The Connector uses file names supplied by the server without checking for path traversal, a trick where a file name points outside the folder it should stay in. A malicious or impersonated server could write files anywhere on the engineering workstation and then run code with the user's rights. CODESYS says this one also depends on commands being run through the Connector's scripting interface. It affects the Connector from version 1.23.0.0 up to, but not including, 1.40.0.0 (CODESYS advisory 2026-14, also listed as VDE-2026-146).

All three need the user's machine to talk to a server that is fake or being intercepted, and none of them needs a password. That is why the attack has a high complexity rating, but it is also why the engineering workstation is the target.

Where this shows up, plant floor to cloud

Red Tiger's view is that the real exposure here is the engineering laptop. It is the one machine that can change the logic in your controllers, and it often travels between sites, the office network, hotel Wi-Fi and vendor networks. When that laptop reaches out to an Automation Server, whether it is hosted in the cloud or on a server in your own network, the tools covered by these advisories decide whether to trust what comes back. If that trust can be faked, an attacker who gets on the same network path, such as a shared contractor network or a poorly segmented plant network, can turn the engineering tool against the plant.

On the plant side, Edge Gateways connect the Automation Server to the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and drives. CVE-2026-118497 matters there because a bad certificate accepted during enrollment can let someone watch and change traffic between the server and the controller network. Integrators and machine builders who use the Automation Server to manage customer projects should treat this as their own patch as well, because their laptops visit many plants.

What to do now

  1. Update the CODESYS Automation Server Connector and the CODESYS Service Tool to version 1.40.0.0 on every engineering workstation and laptop. Both can be updated through the CODESYS Installer or the CODESYS Store. Include contractor and integrator laptops that connect to your plant, and ask your machine builders whether their tools bundle these add-ons.
  2. Make sure your engineering tools only talk to the Automation Server you actually use. Confirm the server address and its certificate before enrolling, never accept a certificate prompt you did not expect, and remove server entries you do not recognize.
  3. Keep the path between the engineering workstation, the Automation Server and the Edge Gateways on trusted networks. Do not run engineering sessions from public or shared Wi-Fi, put remote engineering behind a virtual private network (VPN) with multifactor authentication, and firewall Edge Gateways so only the server and the workstations that need them can reach them.
  4. Restrict who can run scripts through the CODESYS Development System, keep engineering workstations on current antivirus and endpoint protection, and watch for unexpected new files or programs appearing on them after project syncs.

Red Tiger can help with this beyond the assessment itself. During our onsite facility assessments, our team inventories engineering workstations and the software they run, reviews how they reach controllers and remote servers, and works with operators and integrators on a patching plan that keeps the plant running. We can also install a firewall and sensor at the site, connect them to the Red Tiger 24x7 security operations center (SOC), and monitor the plant for ongoing detection and response, with regular metrics and reports. Our team has completed more than 500 assessments and trained more than 4,500 people.

We are here to help, so check out our resources online at www.redtigersecurity.com and book a follow-up call with our team if you have any questions: https://calendly.com/jonathanpollet/30min

Source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, CODESYS security advisory AV26-1169, 17 November 2026: https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts-advisories/control-systems-codesys-security-advisory-av26-1169

← All advisories

Cite this advisory: Red Tiger Security, "CODESYS Engineering Tools Can Be Fooled by a Fake Automation Server", November 18, 2026, https://www.redtigersecurity.com/advisory/codesys-automation-server-connector-service-tool-vulnerabilities

Read the original source →

We are here to help.

Check out our resources and book a follow-up call with our team.

+1.877.387.7733